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a b s t r a c t 
When the Internet user keys a search term and clicks “enter”, a series of snippets, images 
and html links will appear typically running into several web pages. In the case of Autocom- 
plete suggestions, the result appearing on the bar changes with each keystroke even before 
the user clicks “enter”. As a result, in the course of finding search results from the origi- 
nal search term, the user is constantly provided with suggestions of other search terms. 
The search results and Autocomplete suggestions may be defamatory of individuals and 
businesses by associating them with dishonest and improper activities or conduct. Should 
search engines be regarded as a publisher of such defamatory search results and/or Auto- 
complete suggestions? What is the appropriate legal approach for establishing search en- 
gine responsibility in such instances? The paper considers the above questions by reference 
to case precedents drawn primarily from common law jurisdictions and commentaries on 
the liability of search engines and other Internet intermediaries as well as policy rationales 
and considerations. 
© 2019 Gary Chan Kok Yew. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
When the Internet user keys a search term and clicks “en- 
ter”, a series of snippets, images and html links will appear 
typically running into several web pages. In the case of Auto- 
complete suggestions, the result appearing on the bar changes 
with each keystroke even before the user clicks “enter”. As a 
result, in the course of finding search results from the origi- 
nal search term, the user is constantly provided with sugges- 
tions of other search terms. The main factors that influence 
the search algorithms include the web pages indexed by the 
search engine, the users’ geographical location and their prior 
search history. The search results may associate a person or 
business with improper or dishonest activities such as a scam 
or fraud that lowers their reputation. The defamed party may 
have suffered pecuniary damages as a result and/or may want 
E-mail address: garychan@smu.edu.sg 
to delete the search output. Should the search engine be liable 
as a publisher of defamatory search output in such cases? 
Courts are still divided over the controversial issue relat- 
ing to search engine liability in defamation. Judicial responses 
have ranged from denying any legal liability on the part of the 
search engine in England on the basis that the searches are 
automated and not dependent on human agency to the de- 
velopments in Australia and Hong Kong that search engines 
ought to be responsible where they have received notification 
of a defamatory search output. Even when the judges agree 
that search engines should be legally liable, they may differ in 
terms of the bases and/or scope of liability. One related ques- 
tion is whether the analysis or approach to determine legal 
responsibility of search engines should vary depending on the 
types of search output generated by search engines. 
The central issues in this essay are: should search engines 
be liable in defamation for search results such as html links, 
snippets, images and /or Autocomplete suggestions arising 
from search terms keyed in by the users? If so, what is the 
appropriate legal approach for establishing search engine 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2019.01.002 
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liability in such circumstances? The paper considers the 
above questions by reference to case precedents drawn 
primarily (though not exclusively) from common law juris- 
dictions and commentaries on the liability of search engines 
and other Internet intermediaries in defamation actions, and 
proposes a framework for finding search engine liability in 
the 21st century. My starting point would be the existing legal 
principles in the tort of defamation. Here the prime factors 
for determining publication and responsibility of search 
engines for defamatory search results and Autocomplete sug- 
gestions would be the existence and level of control exercised 
by the search engine; the purported acts and/or omissions of 
the search engines; and finally, the nature and extent of the 
search engines’ knowledge and intention. 
This paper will draw upon legal tests and approaches from 
traditional cases decided even before the Internet era as well 
as those involving Internet intermediaries (such as website 
hosts, providers of Internet discussion forums and hyper- 
linkers) particularly where they concern issues of publication 
and responsibility for the defamatory search results and Auto- 
complete suggestions. The analysis would have to be applied 
in a consistent manner taking into account the different types 
of search output generated. Policy considerations and ratio- 
nales relating to search engines which both support and run 
contrary to the legal principles will also be examined. It re- 
mains to be seen whether the new wine of search engines will 
fit the old bottles of existing defamation laws some of which 
may even have originated in the 19th century. 
2. The legal principles: control, acts and/or 
omissions 
Assuming the search results and Autocomplete suggestions 
(collectively, the “search output”) are defamatory of the plain- 
tiff, and it is shown that the search engine is to be regarded 
as a publisher of the search output, the search engine will be 
found legally liable for defamation unless it can raise a viable 
defence in the tort of defamation. Hence, the issue of publi- 
cation will be one key aspect of this essay. I will analyse the 
issue of publication by reference to the search engines oper- 
ator’s conduct comprising both the relevant act and/or omis- 
sion and its state of mind. 
To ascertain search engine conduct in relation to the al- 
leged publication of search results and Autocomplete sugges- 
tions, we need to first assess the element of control exercised 
by the search engine operator. The nature of the control and 
the extent thereof will form the background and context for 
analysing search engine conduct. 
2.1. Elements of control 
As a preliminary point, there must first be control in the op- 
eration of a search engine. In A v Google New Zealand Ltd ,1 
defamatory statements posted on a website in US hosted by a 
third party were accessed via a search of the plaintiff’s name. 
The search engine accessed the defamatory postings through 
1 [2012] NZHC 2352. 
www.google.co.nz , a domain name registered by Google Inc 
with NZ Domain Name Registry Ltd. The plaintiff requested 
the defendant, an indirect subsidiary of Google Inc incorpo- 
rated in Delaware, to block access to the website. Google NZ 
could not remove the URLs from the searches through the 
New Zealand domain name as the search engine was operated 
by Google Inc, which also owned and controlled the domain 
name. The mere forwarding of a request by the defendant to 
Google Inc to remove the material did not render the defen- 
dant a publisher of the material. The subsequent case of Rana 
v Google Australia Pty Ltd 2 has endorsed a similar position in 
Australia. 
In addition to the preliminary requirement of operational 
control, it is proposed that “control” be analysed as follows: 
1) The first element of control involves the overall design of al- 
gorithms to enable the searches to be performed by users 
which then generate the search results (links, images and 
snippets) and Autocomplete suggestions. This includes the 
degree to which search results or Autocomplete sugges- 
tions are dependent on, amongst others, the popularity 
and currency of Internet inputs, and the key words used. 
Search engines possess design control based on the search 
algorithms that operate in an automated manner. Some 
of the Internet content would have already existed at the 
point of the implementation of the design rubrics. New 
content would be added to the Internet from time to time. 
In such an instance, the design is programmed ex ante 
which means that it takes place prior to the generation 
of the new content on the various websites from which 
the search results or Autocomplete suggestions may be de- 
rived. 
This first element of design control is of course not static. 
The search engine operator may modify the overall design 
rubrics from time to time such as the popularity rankings, 
key words and indexing. 
2) The second element of control is with regards to the content 
on the various websites from which search results and Au- 
tocomplete suggestions are derived. First, the search out- 
put that are generated reflect the content of third party 
websites at the point in time the sites were last crawled by 
the computer robots; this means that subsequent changes 
in the various sites will not be captured in the search out- 
put until the next crawl.3 When the website owners have 
made changes to their sites, they may request Google to 
do a “recrawl”.4 Secondly, search engines have the ability 
to exclude or filter certain word associations so as to pre- 
vent specific search results or Autocomplete suggestions 
from appearing. This can be done in various ways through 
robots exclusion protocols and metatags which instruct 
the search engine (such as Google) not to: index certain web 
pages; follow certain links on a specific web page; store a 
cached copy of a web page; and show a snippet from the 
2 [2013] FCA 60 [40]. 
3 Niemala v Malamas 2015 BCSC 1024 [72]. 
4 See Google Search at https://support.google.com/webmasters/ 
answer/6065812?hl=en (accessed on 11 June 2018). 
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web page in search returns.5 In this way, the search engines 
exercise control over the indexing of webpages. This ability 
to exercise control over the content from time to time over- 
laps with the first element of design control mentioned 
above. In addition, since 2014, Google may “prevent speci- 
fied autocompletions of search queries being presented to 
a user”.6 
There are nonetheless limits to the search engines’ con- 
trol over content. Though search engines are able to block 
the URLs, the websites can change their URLs. Further, the 
search engine operator cannot block a URL containing par- 
ticular search terms such as a specific name without block- 
ing URLs containing similar names. Such filtering of words 
associations or blocking of URLs can take place before ( ex 
ante ) or after ( ex post ) the discovery or receipt of a complaint 
relating to the alleged defamatory search output. 
3) The third element of control pertains to the absence of con- 
trol over the parties making the searches. In fact, the search 
engine operator does not know the identity of the users 
who would make the searches or when the users would 
be making the searches. It does not have control over the 
actions of the party at the time of the posting of defam- 
atory content from which the search results and Auto- 
complete suggestions may have been derived. In particular, 
the search engine operator does not have any control over 
what the third party user would key in as a search term. 
However, the search engine does possess some knowledge 
of which search queries have been made in the past. 
In summary, the Input–Output Model for search engines 
may be represented as follows: 
Inputs (search engine design rubrics or algorithms + the 
Internet content + user search terms) → (automated pro- 
cess) → Outputs (i.e. the search results and Autocomplete 
suggestions) 
The case of Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Espanola de 
Proteccion de Datos and Mario Costeja Gonzalez (“Google Spain ”),7 
though not a defamation case, provided useful pointers on the 
control element. Some personal data regarding the data sub- 
ject had been published by a Spanish newspaper, in two of its 
printed issues in 1998, both of which were republished at a 
later date in its electronic version made available on the In- 
ternet. The data subject argued that this information should 
no longer be displayed in the search results presented by the 
Internet search engine operated by Google, when a search is 
made of his name and surnames. The Court of Justice of the 
European Union agreed as the initial publication had taken 
place 16 years earlier and that the links to that information 
5 David Lindsay, “The ‘right to be forgotten’ by search engines 
under data privacy law: a legal and policy analysis of the Costeja 
decision” in Andrew T Kenyon (ed.), Comparative Defamation and Pri- 
vacy Law (Cambridge University Press, 2016) p. 203. 
6 Google v Duffy [2017] SASCFC 130 para [29], per Kourakis CJ. 
7 Case 131/12, Google Spain SL v Agencia Espanloa de Proteccion de 
Datos and Mario Costeja Gonzalez [2014] CMLR 50 (ECJ (Grand Cham- 
ber)). 
should be removed from the list of results.8 On the question 
of control, it was noted by the European Court of Justice (Grand 
Chamber) that the combinations of the keywords and the URL 
addresses form the index of the search engine.9 The search 
engine controls the index which in turn links key words to 
the relevant URL addresses. In essence, it determines how the 
index is structured, and it is capable of blocking certain search 
results, for example, by not displaying the URL addresses.10 
In one of the earliest cases on search engine liability in 
defamation – Metropolitan International Schools Limited (T/A 
Skillstrain and/or Train2Game) v Designtechnica Corporation (T/A 
Digital Trends), Google UK Limited, Google Inc 11 – the first defen- 
dant maintained a website, which contained separate bulletin 
boards or forums. The claimant alleged that certain forum 
postings by users contained defamatory materials concerning 
the claimant and sued the third defendant, which owned 
and operated the search engine technology, for publishing 
a search return for the threads containing such defamatory 
statements. An Internet search performed on ‘Train2Game’ 
(the trading name of the claimant) produced the search result 
‘Train2Game new SCAM for Scheidegger’ (which was the 
former trading name of the claimant). The English court held 
that as it is the user, rather than the third defendant, who 
formulates the search terms, the third defendant is not a 
“publisher” of the defamatory material. This relates to the 
absence of control over third party searches (third element). 
Moreover, with respect to overall design control (first element), 
the court noted that the web-crawling “robots” performed the 
search and there was no human agent involved in the process. 
An analogy was drawn by the English court between the 
search engine operator and a compiler of a library catalogue 
which would not be responsible for the contents of the books 
in the physical shelves. Further, the third defendant could not 
exercise any control over the search terms typed by the third 
party users and hence should not be regarded as having autho- 
rised or acquiesced in the process. Eady J also noted that an 
injunction against the third defendant to restrain the publica- 
tion would be futile as it would not be able to prevent a person 
from making searches. Even if it blocked certain URLs, it would 
not be able to prevent the third party from using a different 
URL to avoid the block, thereby suggesting there are limits to 
control over content. Unlike other Internet intermediaries, the 
search engine operator was not in a position to “take down”
the offending material. As Justice Eady in Metropolitan 12 noted, 
A search engine, however, is a different kind of Internet in- 
termediary. It is not possible to draw a complete analogy 
with a website host. One cannot merely press a button to 
ensure that the offending words will never reappear on a 
Google search snippet: there is no control over the search 
terms typed in by future users. If the words are thrown up 
in response to a future search, it would by no means follow 
8 This “right to be forgotten” in respect of personal information 
is further discussed in Section 5.1 below. 
9 Google Spain SL para [73]. 
10 Google Spain SL para [91]. 
11 [2011] 1 WLR 1743. 
12 [2011] 1 WLR 1743 [55]. 
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that the Third Defendant has authorised or acquiesced in 
that process. 
From the discussion above, Justice Eady seemed to have fo- 
cused on the search engine’s lack of control at the point when 
search results are generated by the user’s search inputs. The 
learned judge did not however specifically consider the ex- 
istence and level of ex ante control exercised by the search 
engine operator (such as in designing the search algorithms) 
prior to the searches and actual production of search results. 
In this regard, it would be pertinent to examine the level of hu- 
man agent involvement in the design of algorithms even if it 
was the robots which automatically performed the searches. 
One approach would be to treat the algorithmic programmes 
as a tool used by humans to produce the search output.13 In 
such an analysis, the human should remain responsible for 
the effects or results generated by the tool assuming the lat- 
ter performs as originally designed. 
Similar to Metropolitan , in the subsequent Australian deci- 
sion in Bleyer v Google Inc ,14 the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales took the view that there was no human input in the 
application of Google’s search engine apart from the creation 
of the algorithm. Hence, Google could not be held liable as a 
publisher for the results. Again, it is submitted that we cannot 
exclude human agency from the entire search process which 
begins in the first place with the overall design control. It is 
fair to say that though search engines have put in place the 
automated search process, that automated process is after- 
all based on algorithms that were originally designed by hu- 
man agents. There is clearly an element of human autonomy 
and choice in the way the algorithms are programmed, not to 
mention the subsequent control that may be exercised over 
content. This issue will be further explored in the subsequent 
developments taking place in Australia and Hong Kong. 
In summary, the search engine exercises design control in 
the use of algorithms as well as control over the index and 
key words and is capable of excluding specific terms. In this 
regard, the search engine is not a mere conduit. However, the 
search engine does not have control over the specific contents 
of postings except indirectly in its indexing of key words and 
terms, and certainly does not have direct control over the acts 
of the users in imputing search terms. The huge volume of 
postings on the Internet also renders the tasks of controlling 
individual search output onerous. Hence, overall, it does not 
exercise any editorial judgment ( ex ante content control) over 
the allegedly defamatory search output. 
2.2. Acts 
Bearing in mind the control elements, we now examine 
whether there is any relevant act of publication that may be 
attributed to the search engines. In this regard, we should be 
sensitive to the specific types of search output when consid- 
ering the issue of publication. 
13 Century 21 Canada Limited Partnership v Rogers Communications Inc 
and Anor 2011 BCSC 1196 (2 September 2011) para [129]; cited in Dr 
Yeung Sau Shing Albert v Google Inc [2014] 5 HKC 375. 
14 [2014] NSWSC 897. 
One category of search output is the alleged defamatory 
content found in hyperlinks generated by search engines. In 
Crookes v Newton ,15 the majority 16 held that the act of hyper- 
linking defamatory material does not constitute publication 
of the hyperlinked defamatory content. The act of hyperlink- 
ing merely makes reference to the existence of the hyperlinked 
material but not its content . Moreover, there is no control over 
the hyperlinked material 17 and the hyperlinker did not partic- 
ipate in the creation and development of the content.18 One 
relevant question here is whether a selection of hyperlinks 
generated by the search engine in response to users’ search 
queries should be treated in the same manner. 
The snippets, on the other hand, are extracts from Internet 
content found in various websites. In generating these snip- 
pets, the search engine may be repeating defamatory content 
from those websites albeit in the form of extracts. Such ex- 
tracts may have the same defamatory meaning as the original 
content from the websites, or a different defamatory meaning 
due to the truncated content or may not be defamatory at all. 
Assuming it has the same defamatory meaning as the original 
content, the search engine would under the repetition rule be 
liable for defamation to the same extent.19 In addition, images 
matter may be generated by the search engine. The placement 
of images, for example, in association with the photos of cer- 
tain well-known and unsavoury characters or in conjunction 
with some derogatory language may give rise to defamatory 
imputations. 
Autocomplete suggestions are association of words or 
phrases generated as and when the user keys in the search 
terms. Unlike the snippets, these word associations are not 
repeated content from other Internet sources. It has been ar- 
gued that “the suggested terms constitute more than a mere 
technical and passive reflection of other users’ search queries. 
Rather, from the perspective of an ordinary reasonable person, 
the search engine creates and publishes new content.”20 In 
Dr Yeung Sau Shing Albert v Google Inc ,21 the Hong Kong court 
noted that Google Inc. “recombines” and “aggregates” data 
from web content, “reconstitutes” aggregations based on what 
other users have, at one point in time, typed and then ‘trans- 
forms’ that data into suggestions and predictions. 
15 [2011] 3 SCR 269. 
16 Binnie, LeBel, Abella, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ. 
17 [2011] 3 SCR 269 [26,27]. 
18 [2011] 3 SCR 269 [28]. Cf the copyright infringement case 
in GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV and others 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:644, European Court of Justice (8 September, 
2016)(that the fact of posting, on a website, hyperlinks to protected 
works, which are freely available on another website without the 
consent of the copyright holder, constitutes a ‘communication to 
the public’ under Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the Euro- 
pean Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 depends on 
whether the links are provided without the pursuit of financial 
gain by a person who did not know or could not reasonably have 
known the illegal nature of the publication of those works on that 
other website; and where those links are provided for such a pur- 
pose, knowledge must be presumed.). 
19 See Metropolitan International Schools Limited [2011] 1 WLR 1743 
[52], pe r Eady J. 
20 Jan Oster, “Communication, Defamation and Liability” (2015) 
35(2) Legal Studies 348 at 359. 
21 [2014] 5 HKC 375. 
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The descriptors “passive” versus “active” role or involve- 
ment – which has been utilised by courts to differentiate a 
publisher from a non-publisher of defamatory content – are 
in themselves not sufficient. At times, the language is used in 
the context of establishing an act or omission to show publica- 
tion or responsibility or otherwise (such as whether an inter- 
mediary is a mere conduit for the defamatory content passing 
through). In other cases, it appears to refer to the mental el- 
ements associated with the publication (such as the test of 
“knowing involvement” in Bunt v Tilley ). More analysis would 
be required to distil the nature and type of acts and/or omis- 
sions and the state of mind respectively that would satisfy the 
“publication” requirement. 
2.2.1. Adoption and endorsement of defamatory search output 
not a relevant act of publication for search engines 
The search engine operator may generate hyperlinks to 
defamatory content in response to search queries. McLach- 
lin CJ and Fish J in Crookes v Newton – not a case about search 
engines but a website operator – stated that a hyperlink con- 
tained in the text would amount to publication if the text, read 
contextually, indicates “adoption or endorsement of the content 
of the hyperlinked text ”.22 The terms “adoption” and “endorse- 
ment” imply some form of agreement whether expressly or 
impliedly on the part of the search engine with respect to 
the contents. This means that the defamatory content, if so 
adopted or endorsed, would be treated as incorporated into 
the text of the search results via the hyperlink. 
For the series of links generated by the search engine oper- 
ator, it is difficult to regard the search engine operator as hav- 
ing adopted or endorsed the entire set of links. First, some of 
the links may well be inconsistent in content with each other. 
Secondly, the list of snippets generated by the search engines, 
to the extent that they merely repeat the defamatory content 
in the original postings, do not suggest that the search engine 
was adopting or endorsing the contents. 
Moreover, the adoption or endorsement of defamatory con- 
tent is a sufficient though not a necessary condition for pub- 
lication. In Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v 
Google Inc ,23 the Federal Court of Australia held that a spon- 
sored link by an advertiser that is displayed by Google’s search 
engine constitutes a response by Google to the user’s search. 
It is made available to the advertiser by Google’s search en- 
gine through the use of its algorithms. Nicholas J, the primary 
judge at first instance, found that Google had only represented 
the sponsored links as advertisements without endorsing or 
adopting them and hence decided that Google had not en- 
gaged in misleading or deceptive conduct under the Aus- 
tralian Trade Practices Act 1974.24 The Federal Court disagreed 
with Nicholas J’s holding, stating that Google’s conduct cannot 
be described as “merely passing on the statements of the ad- 
vertiser”. Keane CJ, Jacobson and Lander JJ also opined that: 25 
… it is an error to conclude that Google has not engaged in 
the conduct of publishing the sponsored links because it 
22 [2011] 3 SCR 269 [48] and [50]. 
23 [2012] FCAFC 49. 
24 (Cth), section 52. 
25 [2012] FCAFC 49 at [87]. 
has not adopted or endorsed the message conveyed by its 
response to the user’s query. 
The user entered the keyword to seek information about 
a particular advertiser; Google responded to the search query 
by providing the user with the URL of one of the advertiser’s 
competitors and therefore Google’s response was held to be 
misleading. 
As argued in Crookes v Newton , the mere fact that the search 
engine presents the links as a response to the search query 
should not be treated as equivalent to the publication of the 
hyperlinked defamatory content.26 
For Autocomplete suggestions, Karapapa and Borghi 27 
noted that they are based on the automated processing of 
the users’ searches and as such, are not independent and 
autonomous outputs of the search engine’s algorithm. Even 
though human agents are involved in the design of the algo- 
rithms, it would still be a stretch to argue that the search en- 
gines adopt or endorse any of the Autocomplete suggestions. 
2.2.2. Drawing of attention to defamatory search output not a 
relevant act of publication for search engines 
To use an analogy from the traditional non-Internet context, 
the defendant in Hird v Wood 28 who pointed at the placard 
containing allegedly defamatory words with his finger and 
attracted attention to it, was taken to have published the 
defamatory words. The Hird v Wood test has been applied to 
the Internet in Carter v BC Federation of Foster Parents Asso- 
ciation 29 in which the defendant’s printed newsletter made 
reference to a forum on a website that contained a defama- 
tory comment. The Canadian court held on the facts that the 
defendant did not take active steps to draw attention to the 
forum containing the defamatory comments.30 
Can we say that search engines draw users’ attention 
to search results and suggestions which the users would 
have not otherwise have found or envisaged? It is argued 
that Hird v Wood may be distinguished from the purported 
acts of search engine. The act of pointing at the placard was 
drawing attention to a specific defamatory statement. On 
the other hand, the acts of search engines in showing the 
links, images, snippets and Autocomplete suggestions, are 
drawing the users’ attention to the list of possible results and 
26 See Niemela v Malamas 2015 BCSC 1024 [60] which adopted the 
position in Crookes v Newton and concluded that the search engine 
is not a publisher of the URLs in the search results. 
27 Stavroula Karapapa and Maurizio Borghi, “Search engine lia- 
bility for autocomplete suggestions: personality, privacy and the 
power of the algorithm” (2015) 23 International Journal of Law and 
Information Technology 261 at 269. 
28 38 Sol J 234. Following the termination of business due to the 
legal action of the plaintiff, a placard was set up which contained 
a notice that subscriptions might be donated to the former owners 
of the business “who have been ruined in their business and their 
living taken away by the animosity of one man” i.e. the plaintiff. 
29 (2005) 42 BCLR (4th) 1. 
30 See also MacFadden v Anthony 117 NYS 2d 520 (1952) (that 
“Winchell’s radio broadcast calling attention to the previous publi- 
cation of Collier’s Magazine containing the alleged libel, and with- 
out re-uttering any of the defamatory matter contained in said 
Collier’s article, is not a republication or publication of a libel”); 
and Klein v Biben 296 NY 638 (1946). 
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suggestions that the user may wish to refer to. That is, unlike 
in Hird v Wood , the search engine is not specifically drawing 
attention to a specific defamatory output as such but merely 
making reference to the list of possibilities for the users’ 
consideration. Moreover, some of the content in the list of 
possibilities may not be defamatory to begin with. 
2.2.3. Participation in and/or lending assistance to the publi- 
cation as a positive act of publication for search engines 
The test of intentionally lending assistance for the purpose 
of publication has already been referred to in pre-Internet 
cases.31 In Webb v Bloch ,32 the test was whether the defendant 
had “intentionally lent his assistance to its existence for the 
purpose of being published, his instrumentality is evidence to 
show a publication by him.” Before the Internet era, the dis- 
tribution of newspapers by the editors, vendors, and retailers 
would constitute an act of participating in the publication. 
With particular regard to search engines, Beach J in Trkulja 
v Google Inc & Anor (No 5) 33 stated that, based on Google’s 
algorithmic processes operating and generating content as 
intended by them, it had lent assistance to publication. In 
another Australian decision, Google Inc v Duffy,34 searches 
for Duffy’s name on Google’s search engines resulted in the 
display of snippets from and hyperlinks to the website known 
as Ripoff Report. Searches for her name on Google resulted in 
the display by Google’s Autocomplete utility of the alternative 
search term “janice duffy psychic stalker”. With regard to 
the snippets, the court held that “Google participated in the 
publication of the paragraphs about Dr Duffy produced by 
its search engine because it intended its search engine to do 
what it programmed it to do”.35 It was further explained that: 
Google’s search results are published when a person mak- 
ing a search sees them on the screen … It is Google 
which designs the programme which authors the words of 
the snippet paragraph. Google’s conduct is the substantial 
cause of the display of the search result on the screen.36 
Hence, the search engine operator had participated in the 
publication on the basis of its overall design control in pro- 
gramming the search engine which was the substantial cause 
of the publication of the defamatory search results. There was 
participation in the publication process notwithstanding the 
search engines’ lack of control over the users and the search 
terms. Building upon the “substantial cause” requirement, it 
is possible that certain snippets or images may not have been 
downloaded or accessed by any person (i.e. published) if it 
were not for the search engine’s algorithmic process. It should, 
however, be noted that such participation is with respect to 
the publication of search output generally and does not imply 
knowledge of the search engine concerning any specific search 
output. 
31 Eg Webb v Bloch [1928] HCA; 41 CLR 331 (members of the com- 
mittee confirmed their instructions to a solicitor to publish the 
defamatory material). 
32 [1928] HCA; 41 CLR 331. 
33 [2012] VSC 533. 
34 [2017] SASCFC 130 (Supreme Court of South Australia). 
35 [2017] SASCFC 130 para [155]. 
36 [2017] SASCFC 130 para [181]. 
The Hong Kong court in Dr Yeung Sau Shing Albert v Google 
Inc 37 had to consider whether Google Inc should be considered 
the publisher of the Autocomplete suggestions and related 
searches and decided that there was ‘plainly a good arguable 
case’ that Google Inc. was not a mere passive facilitator. The 
learned judge appeared to have utilised both the bases of 
Google’s participation and lending of assistance to publication 
of defamatory material: 38 
… it is plainly arguable that a search engine (including 
Google Inc) that generates objectively defamatory materi- 
als by its automated processes is a ‘publisher’ within the 
meaning as explained in Fevaworks Solutions Ltd . … they 
provided the platform for dissemination and/or encour- 
aged/facilitated or actively participated in the publication 
with intent to assist in the process of conveying the im- 
pugned words to publishees…
Whilst the search engine’s acts may be described as partic- 
ipation and/or lending assistance to the publication, it is sub- 
mitted that the reference to the provision of a platform for 
dissemination and the act of “encouraged/facilitated” in the 
above quote would be more pertinent to describe the acts of 
the provider of a discussion forum in Fevaworks rather than 
search engines. 
Cheung 39 regarded Google’s role in Autocomplete sugges- 
tions as neither entirely passive nor active but “interactive”. 
This is because Autocomplete responds to the search query 
as the user types his or her query without the user complet- 
ing his search query, it is akin to a “search-in-progress”. The 
search engine may be regarded, according to Cheung, as a 
“special intermediary processor” following a German Federal 
Court decision.40 Further, Google’s involvement in Autocom- 
plete suggestions is “unique” in its contribution to defamatory 
content. On one hand, the Autocomplete suggestions are gen- 
erated based on the Internet content previously uploaded by 
third party users. On the other hand, the Autocomplete sug- 
gestions are dependent on contemporaneous searches made 
and are not a repetition of the original content. Based on the 
interactive nature of the search engine’s role in generating 
the Autocomplete suggestions, the concept of “participation”
in the publication of Autocomplete suggestions appears quite 
apt. 
Finally, for the avoidance of doubt, participation in the 
business of a search engine operator does not necessar- 
ily mean participation in the publication. Google Inc’s sub- 
sidiaries may seek to promote and sell keyword advertising 
37 [2014] 5 HKC 375. 
38 [2014] 5 HKC 375 para [103]. 
39 A S Y Cheung, “Defaming by suggestion: Searching for Search 
Engine Liability in the Autocomplete Era” in Koltay, A (ed.), Compar- 
ative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom of Expression , Budapest: 
Wolters Kluwer, 2015 at pp. 467–486. 
40 The German court imposed a duty to monitor, block and pre- 
vent predictions of defamatory content on the search engine 
upon receipt of the notice of complaint. See BGH, 14.05.2013, 
VI ZR 269/12; and German Federal Court of Justice, “Liability of 
Search Engine Operator for Autocomplete Suggestions that In- 
fringe Rights of Privacy – “Autocomplete” Function” (2013) 8(10) 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 797. 
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within the respective jurisdictions 41 but this does not amount 
to partaking in the operation of the search engine. Google Aus- 
tralia, which is a subsidiary of Google Inc, does not operate 
or control the Google web search. In Defteros v Google Inc and 
another ,42 Defteros’ argument that Google Australia “partici- 
pated in the business” of Google USA and therefore was a pub- 
lisher of search results was firmly rejected. The evidence, at its 
highest, only showed that Google Australia provided sales and 
marketing support to Google USA, advertised the services, and 
received payment from Google USA for those services. 
2.3. Omissions 
Apart from search engine’s positive acts, we should consider 
whether publication by omission may be a good justification 
for search engine responsibility. This doctrine – which is es- 
sentially based on the defendant’s failure or omission to re- 
move the defamatory material previously posted by a third 
party in circumstances giving rise to an inference that the de- 
fendant had consented to such posting – was enunciated in 
the English case of Byrne v Deane 43 and subsequently applied 
to the Internet context. The plaintiff was a member of a golf 
club and the defendants were the proprietors of the club and 
secretary, respectively. The rules of the club stated that “no 
notice or placard shall be posted in the club premises without 
the consent of the secretary”. An anonymous person put up 
an allegedly defamatory verse concerning the plaintiff on the 
wall of the club. Greer LJ linked the elements of control and 
knowledge to the act of partaking in the publication: 44 
In my judgement the two proprietors of this establishment 
by allowing the defamatory statement, if it be defamatory, 
to rest upon their wall and not to remove it, with the knowl- 
edge that they must have had that by not removing it it 
would be read by people to whom it would convey such 
meaning as it had, were taking part in the publication of it. 
The acts of participation in the process of publication, if 
any, should take place prior to or at the time of publication. 
Here, it is difficult to suggest that the club owners were par- 
ticipating in the publication of the defamatory verse unless 
there were positive acts by the club owners evidencing such 
participation. It is artificial to regard the setting up of the no- 
tice board per se as constituting the very act of participation. 
Slesser LJ 45 observed that control over the posters on the 
wall had passed to the second defendant (the secretary) and 
therefore the first defendants (the proprietors) were not re- 
sponsible for the publication. Greene LJ 46 opined that affixing 
posters on the wall without permission was an act of trespass 
and the defendants had ample power to remove them from 
their property. In contrast with Greer LJ, Greene LJ linked the 
41 David Lindsay, “The ‘right to be forgotten’ by search engines 
under data privacy law: a legal and policy analysis of the Costeja 
decision” in Andrew T Kenyon (ed.), Comparative Defamation and Pri- 
vacy Law , Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 207. 
42 [2017] VSC 158 [64] (4 April 2017). 
43 [1937] 1 KB 818. 
44 [1937] 1 KB 818 at 830. 
45 [1937] 1 KB 818 at 836 
46 [1937] 1 KB 818 at 837. 
elements of control and knowledge to the defendant’s consent 
to publication: 47 
Removal of this particular notice was a perfectly simple 
and easy thing to do involving no trouble whatsoever. The 
defendants, having the power of removing it and the right 
to remove it, and being able to do it without any difficulty 
at all, and knowing that members of the club when they 
came into the room would see it, I think must be taken to 
have elected deliberately to leave it there. The proper infer- 
ence, therefore, in those circumstances it seems to me that 
they were consenting parties to its continued presence on 
the spot where it had been put up. That being so it seems to 
me that they must be taken to have consented to its publi- 
cation to each member who saw it. 
Simpson J in Frawley v New South Wales 48 reiterated that 
consent is the overarching test for publication by omission: 
It is essential that the plaintiff prove that the defendant …
consented to the publication. This could be inferred from 
the fact (if it be the fact) that that person has control over 
the matter complained of but fails to take any steps to pre- 
vent the publication, or to prevent the continued publica- 
tion. 
In similar vein, the Australian court Urbanchich v Drum- 
moyne Municipal Council 49 stated that “[t]he complainant must 
establish in one way or another an acceptance by the respon- 
dent of some responsibility for the continued publication of 
that statement.” Hunt J rejected the imposition of a positive 
duty on an individual to remove defamatory material, except 
where they have “in fact accepted a responsibility for the con- 
tinued publication of those posters”. Pivotal to the acceptance 
of responsibility for a publication was the actual knowledge of 
the existence (but not necessarily the defamatory content) of 
the publication. 
Byrne v Deane was applied in the English Court of Appeal 
decision in Tamiz v Google Inc 50 to Internet intermediaries. 
Defamatory comments were posted on a blog hosted by Blog- 
ger.com which was operated by Google. The court in Tamiz 
stated that if Google had allowed defamatory material to re- 
main on the Blogger.com blog after notification of defamatory 
material, “it might be inferred to have associated itself with, 
or to have made itself responsible for, the continued presence 
of that material on the blog and thereby to have become a 
publisher of that material”.51 This appears to be an ex post 
analysis of the events in order to give rise to an inference 
of responsibility for the publication. However, it should be 
clarified that Google had not, by consenting to the continued 
presence of the material, committed the act of publication. 
The fact of publication should be distinguished from the 
acceptance of responsibility for the publication. The decision, 
in my view, may be better explained on the ground that 
Google, in providing the design tools, putting up the notice 
47 [1937] 1 KB 818 at 838. 
48 [2007] NSWSC 1379. 
49 (1991) Aust Torts Reports 81-127, 69, 193, per Hunt J. 
50 [2013] 1 WLR 2151. 
51 Tamiz v Google Inc [2013] 1 WLR 2151 [34], per Richard LJ. For a 
similar decision, see Davidson v Habeeb [2012] 3 CMLR 6. 
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boards and enabling the blogger to display advertisements, 
had lent assistance to the publication. In any event, it should 
be clarified that the Tamiz decision, which is focused on the 
potential liability of the operator of a blogging platform, did 
not change the Metropolitan position in England which is that a 
search engine is not a publisher of defamatory search output. 
According to the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in Feva- 
works ,52 Byrne v Deane should not be applicable to justify the 
liability of the provider of the Internet discussion forum. The 
Hong Kong court opined that the provider of a discussion fo- 
rum is in a wholly different position from that of the occupier 
of premises who is not in the business of publishing or facili- 
tating publication at all, but who has had imposed on him the 
defamatory act of a trespasser. Moreover, publications on the 
Internet involve a qualitatively different process that is char- 
acterised by open, interactive, “many-to-many” communica- 
tions made and accessed on platforms provided by Internet 
intermediaries. 
The purpose of publication by omission 53 is to supplement 
the absence of a positive act of publication on the part of the 
defendant by reference to knowledge, control and reasonable 
care. Such a positive act of publication may be distinguished 
from publication by omission in two ways. First, the term 
“publication by omission” should be qualified in that there is 
no actual act of publication by the defendant. The focus is in- 
stead on making the defendant responsible for the prior act of 
publication of the person who had posted the original content 
based on the defendant’s consent to the continued presence 
of the content. 
Second, the fact of publication must be distinguished from 
the defendant’s consent to or acceptance of legal responsi- 
bility for the acts of third parties posting the content. Whilst 
the fact of publication takes place when the original posting 
was made, legal responsibility under the doctrine of publica- 
tion by omission arises only at the point when the search en- 
gine operator possesses the relevant control and knowledge 
of defamatory search output upon receipt of a notification or 
complaint and it has the ability to remove the output. Thus, 
the failure to remove the offending output is irrelevant for as- 
sessing whether there was ( ex ante ) a positive act of participa- 
tion in the publication process. 
Given the above, the doctrine of “publication by omission”
is on the whole not appropriate for assessing search engine li- 
ability in defamation. The trespasser context in Byrne v Deane 
is not apt to describe the actions of the Internet user who 
makes a search using a search query. Further, in the case of 
Autocomplete suggestions, the generation of new content in 
the form of the word associations which defame the claimant 
52 Oriental Press Group Ltd v Fevaworks Solutions Ltd [2013] HKCFA 
47; [2013] 5 HKC 253. 
53 See a similar US concept of “affirmative duty to remove”: see 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, s¸ 581 (“Transmission of Defama- 
tion Published by Third Person (1) …one who delivers or transmits 
defamatory matter published by a third person is subject to liabil- 
ity if, but only if, he knows or has reason to know of its defamatory 
character”); and s¸ 577(2) (“[o]ne who intentionally and unreason- 
ably fails to remove defamatory matter that he knows to be ex- 
hibited on land or chattels in his possession or under his control 
is subject to liability for its continued publication”) which is rem- 
iniscent of the English case of Byrne v Deane . 
is the act of the search engine not the primary authors. In 
the case of the snippets, the search engine generates via its 
automatic search process the search results derived from the 
original content in response to a specific search query. Instead 
of analysing the actions as amounting to consent to the con- 
tinued presence of defamatory material, it is more apt to de- 
scribe the search engine as having participated or assisted in 
the publication of the snippets and Autocomplete suggestions 
at the point when the search output was being generated. Fi- 
nally, in terms of control, it is not always easy to remove the 
search output as the search engines can only block the URLs 
or remove links unlike the case in Byrne v Deane . 
3. The mental element: knowledge 
and intention 
The English case of Metropolitan International Schools Ltd sug- 
gests there needs to be a mental element in connection with 
the publication, which was absent in that case. The search 
was performed automatically and did not involve any input 
from the search engine, ‘which had not authorised or caused 
the snippet to appear on the user’s screen in any meaning- 
ful sense but had merely by the provision of its search service 
played the role of a facilitator’ 54 (though, as we have men- 
tioned above, there is clearly an element of human agency in 
the design of the algorithmic search process). The upshot of 
Metropolitan is that even if the search engine was notified of li- 
bellous search output, it would nevertheless not be responsible 
as a publisher of the output. 
In similar vein, Bunt v Tilley 55 established the principle that 
if the role of the Internet intermediary was merely passive 
with respect to the dissemination of the material, it should 
not regarded as a publisher. The Internet service providers 
(fourth to sixth defendants i.e. AOL, Tiscali, BT) successfully 
obtained applications to strike out the claims against them 
as they were not publishers of the postings. To be liable, de- 
fendant must be knowingly involved in the process of publi- 
cation.56 AOL, Tiscali and BT were not aware of the allegedly 
defamatory postings. Thus, the “ISPs do not participate in the 
process of publication as such, but merely act as facilitators 
in a similar way to the postal services. They provide a means 
of transmitting communication without in any way partici- 
pating in that process”.57 Hence, facilitating the transmission 
of communications without any knowledge in the process does 
not give rise to liability for the Internet service providers. 
3.1. Actual knowledge of the fact of publication 
and intention to publish 
With regard to the knowledge requirement, it is argued that 
actual knowledge of the operator as to the fact of publication 
of the specific defamatory search output would be required 
for legal liability. In contrast to the Metropolitan position, the 
54 [2011] 1 WLR 1743 at 1757. 
55 [2006] 3 All ER 336. 
56 But it is not necessary for the publisher to be aware that the 
contents of the postings in question were defamatory. 
57 [2006] 3 All ER 336 [9]. 
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search engine should be legally responsible as a publisher to 
the extent that it has actual knowledge of the specific search 
output (namely snippets, images and Autocomplete sugges- 
tions) which are generated by the programme that it has in- 
tentionally designed and modified. 
An interesting question is the precise time at which 
knowledge or intention on the part of the search engine 
arises for the purpose of establishing the “publication re- 
quirement” in defamation. Beach J in Trkulja v Google (No 5) 58 
stated that “… Internet search engines, while operating in an 
automated fashion from the moment a request is typed into 
them, operate precisely as intended by those who own them 
and who provide their services”. At the point of design of the 
search algorithm, the allegedly defamatory material may not 
have been posted. If so, the intention to publish by the search 
engine would not be relevant for the purpose of assigning 
legal responsibility for the specific defamatory material. It is 
only at the point in time when the user types a search query 
which generates the specific defamatory search output that 
is accessed by a third party that the search engines’ intention 
to publish would become relevant. However, at this stage, 
though the search engine has committed an intentional act 
of publication of search output generally, there may not be 
any actual acknowledge of any specific search output that has 
been generated. 
By actual knowledge, we mean the knowledge acquired 
by humans of a specific search output not the information 
embedded in the artificial computer systems. Hence, actual 
(human) knowledge arises upon the notification or receipt of 
complaint by the human agents (for example, the engineers of 
the search engine) in the ordinary course of work on behalf of 
the search engine company with respect to a particular search 
output. In Google Inc v Duffy ,59 the court stated that, upon noti- 
fication, the search engine will be attributed with knowledge 
of subsequent publications its search engine is likely to pro- 
duce if it does not take steps to block the offending URL. Hence, 
legal responsibility should only arise when the search engine 
possesses actual knowledge of the defamatory output and it 
does not remove the offending links after a reasonable period 
of time. 
This is consistent with the New Zealand Court of Appeal’s 
decision in Murray v Wishart 60 that proof of the Facebook 
host’s actual knowledge of the existence of defamatory third 
party comments on his Facebook page is required for publica- 
tion. Proof of constructive knowledge, on the other hand, was 
held to be insufficient to establish publication. This position 
is correct. Assume that the lower threshold of constructive 
knowledge were to be accepted. In such a case, the search 
engine may not know that it has via its automated process 
generated the relevant snippets, images or Autocomplete 
suggestions. It cannot therefore be said to have intentionally 
participated in or lent assistance to the publication of a spe- 
cific search output. Adopting the constructive knowledge test 
implies that the search engine would become legally respon- 
sible as publisher once the defamatory comments, which the 
search engine ought to know will likely be posted, has been 
58 [2012] VSC 533 [27], per Beach J. 
59 [2017] SASCFC 130 [185] and [596]. 
60 [2014] 3 NZLR 722. 
posted. Accepting constructive knowledge as a threshold 
would therefore run contrary to the existing requirement that 
the defendant be shown to have intentionally published the 
material in question. 
Let us apply to the different types of search output. As dis- 
cussed above, the search engine, in generating the snippets in 
response to users’ search queries, is repeating or re-publishing 
content from other Internet sources which have already been 
published. For Autocomplete suggestions, the word associa- 
tions generated from the typing of search terms by the user 
are arguably new content.61 
With regard to responsibility for repetition/republication of 
the snippets, the repeated/republished content must be the 
same or substantially similar to that of the original posting.62 
Hence, with respect to the snippets, as long as they adhere to 
the substance of the original defamatory postings by the orig- 
inal author, that would suffice as a repetition/republication of 
the defamatory posting. The repetition rule applies to render 
the search engine liable for repeating defamatory statements 
even if the source is from the original author unless the search 
engine has unequivocally denied or disassociated itself from 
the defamatory posting.63 
Whether the search engine would reasonably foresee the 
repetition/republication of the specific defamatory output al- 
leged by the plaintiff is less clear bearing in mind the enor- 
mous volume of information on the Internet at any given 
time.64 The search engine would be hard put to foresee the 
search terms to be entered by the users. The level of foresee- 
ability on the part of the search engine will have to be assessed 
by reference to the indexed key words or excluded terms as 
well as common searches made in the past. If there are cer- 
tain clearly offensive terms that have not been excluded by the 
search engine which it would reasonably foresee to lead to the 
generation of specific defamatory search results, the search 
engine may be held responsible for those specific search re- 
sults. The foreseeability of consequences of the overall design 
is based on the frequency of searches and the available con- 
tent on the Internet which is subject to content to be uploaded 
by Internet users in future. Compared to the contents to be 
monitored by a host of a Facebook page as in Murray v Wishart , 
the materials available for dissemination on the Internet and 
tracked by the search engine are significantly more volumi- 
nous. 
61 Ghatnekar’s reference to Autocomplete as an “algorithm based 
re-publisher” is therefore not entirely accurate: see Seema Ghat- 
nekar, ‘Injury by Algorithm: A Look into Google’s Liability for 
Defamatory Autocompleted Search Suggestions’ (2012–2013) 33 
Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review 171 at 201 (the con- 
cept lies between a distributor and a typical publisher). 
62 See The Wellness Group Pte Ltd and another v OSIM International 
Ltd and others and another suit [2016] 3 SLR 729 that the defen- 
dant would be liable for a republication of the defendant’s origi- 
nal statement where the republication adheres to the sense and 
substance of the statement given by the defendant. 
63 Bik v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1979] 2 NSWLR 679. 
64 See Delfi AS v Estonia Application no 64569/09 (Grand Chamber, 
European Court of Human Rights, 16 June 2015) on the liabilities of 
an Internet news portal for third party comments based on their 
constructive knowledge that the portal will generate the offending 
comments. 
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Overall, the test of reasonable foreseeability or construc- 
tive knowledge of publication would give rise to uncertainty in 
application and outcomes with regard to search engines. The 
actual knowledge test is preferred. A useful proxy for deter- 
mining actual knowledge would be the receipt of notification 
or complaint of allegedly defamatory search output. 
3.2. Knowledge of defamatory nature of content not 
necessary for publication 
Proof of knowledge as to the defamatory nature of the search 
output should not be required. Due to the strict liability na- 
ture of defamation, there is no need for proof of intention to 
defame.65 This fundamental nature of the tort of defamation 
should not be changed as we seek to find appropriate solu- 
tions to ascertain the publication requirement. 
Beach J in Trkulja v Google (No 5) 66 held that “it was open to 
the jury to conclude that Google Inc was a publisher – even if it 
did not have notice of the content of the material about which 
the complaint was made”. The court in Google Inc v Duffy 67 
also decided that it was not necessary to prove that Google 
had knowledge of or adopted the contents of its search re- 
sults. Oster 68 provided a different explanation: ‘publication’, 
better understood as ‘communication’, is to be conceptualised 
as a merely factual requirement for the liability of communi- 
cation intermediaries for defamation; thus, in order to be con- 
sidered ‘publisher’, awareness of the fact of communication is 
required, but not knowledge of the publication’s defamatory 
content. 
An analogy may be drawn to the repetition rule in defama- 
tion already discussed above. A person who repeats a defama- 
tory statement from a specific source is similarly liable as the 
source. The search engine in generating the snippets from the 
original defamatory postings, to the extent that they are sub- 
stantially similar, should be liable as publishers of the snip- 
pets even if it did not have specific knowledge that the content 
was defamatory. 
There is a related issue as to what the search engine 
operator should do when confronted with a notification of 
defamatory search result. Should it block the relevant URL or 
take down the posting? Should it remove search results only 
from websites associated with a specific country’s domain 
name or on a global basis? 69 Should it determine whether the 
content was in fact defamatory or whether there are viable 
defences? Taking down defamatory search results without 
a court order amounts to interference with free speech akin 
to the granting of an interim mandatory injunction in favour 
65 See Cassidy v Daily Mirror Newspapers, Ltd [1929] 2 KB 331 (that 
the lack of intention or motive of the defendant in publishing is 
not a valid defence against liability in defamation). 
66 [2012] VSC 533 [30], per Beach J. 
67 [2017] SASFC 130 para [156]. 
68 Jan Oster, “Communication, Defamation and Liability” (2015) 
35(2) Legal Studies 348 at 349. 
69 See e.g., Macquarie Bank Limited v Berg [1999] NSWSC 526 [13–
15] (where injunction to restrain online defamation was refused 
due to its potential global effect); Google Inc v Equustek Solutions Inc. 
[2017] 1 SCR 824 (worldwide interlocutory injunction granted to 
stop the use of websites to unlawfully sell intellectual property of 
another company in breach of court orders). 
of the complainant without any finding on the merits that 
the search result was indeed defamatory and that there are 
no viable defences. However, if search engines do not block 
the URL or take down defamatory search results, they run 
the risk of being sued for defamation and may be obliged 
to compensate for damages and bear legal costs should the 
court determine they are responsible.70 To deal with this 
problem of uncertainty, detailed statutory rules may have to 
be designed for search engine operators.71 
Insofar as the common law position is concerned, it is sub- 
mitted that only proof of the actual knowledge of the fact of 
publication would trigger the search engine’s responsibility 
to remove the offending postings unless the content of the 
postings was assessed by the search engine to be not defam- 
atory. If the search engine does not take down the offending 
material upon notification within a reasonable time and the 
court subsequently finds the search output to be defamatory, 
the search engine may be liable for the additional damages 
suffered after a reasonable time period has lapsed. Alterna- 
tively, an injunction may be ordered to remove the offending 
output. 
4. Search engines as secondary publishers 
and defence of innocent dissemination 
If the requirement of proof of actual knowledge of the fact of 
publication on the part of search engines is not accepted, it is 
proposed that the defence of innocent dissemination be avail- 
able as another layer of protection to search engines. This de- 
fence is only available to distributors of defamatory material 
(secondary publishers) as opposed to the original authors or 
editors of such content (primary publishers). 
The factors of control and knowledge are relevant for deter- 
mining whether a person based on a given set of facts should 
be regarded as a primary or secondary publisher. The Hong 
Kong decision in Oriental Press Group Ltd v Fevaworks Solutions 
Ltd 72 applied both the knowledge and control criteria to de- 
termine that the provider of an Internet discussion group was 
indeed a subordinate publisher. This was because the provider 
was not aware of the content of the postings and did not exer- 
cise sufficient editorial control to prevent their dissemination. 
Like newsvendors and distributors, a search engine opera- 
tor would at the most qualify as a secondary publisher given 
that it does not exercise any editorial judgment or control 
prior to the publication of the defamatory search output. In 
70 But see article by Chris Silver Smith on “Google thaws (a lit- 
tle) on defamation cases” on the recent practice by Google not 
to remove defamatory content upon receipt of court orders in 
the US though there have been a few cases where Google has 
responded at https://searchengineland.com/google- thaws- little- 
defamation- cases- 271612 (accessed on 11 June, 2018). 
71 Inspiration may be drawn from the provisions for website oper- 
ators in the UK Defamation Act 2013, Section 5 (that it is a defence 
if the website operator did not post the defamatory content but 
such defence can be defeated in specified circumstances where 
the claimant proved that it was not possible to identify the origi- 
nal author, the claimant has notified the operator and the operator 
had not responded in accordance with the regulations.) 
72 [2013] HKCFA 47; [2013] 5 HKC 253. 
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Google v Duffy , as it was practically impossible for Google to 
review the contents of the search results before the display 
on screens, the search engine was treated as a secondary 
publisher of the search results.73 Google was a participant 
in the publication of the snippets. It did not have advance 
knowledge of the contents of search results. As a result, 
knowledge of the search results and defamatory contents 
should not be attributed to it until notice is given.74 This may 
be contrasted to the situation for primary publishers (such 
as authors or editors) who are presumed to be aware of the 
defamatory contents at the point of publication. 
It should also be highlighted that the control element is 
not evaluated in an “all or nothing” fashion but is measured 
in degrees. The degree of control may be inversely related to 
volume of potential search results. To the extent that the vol- 
ume of potential content relevant to the search index is huge, 
the search engine would not be able, all other things being 
equal, to exercise as much control over the content. This fac- 
tor is dependent on the state of technology. Embedded within 
the technology is also a conscious desire for greater speed in 
the generation of search results without the need for prior 
vetting. 
In the case of Dr Yeung ,75 Justice Ng referred to Google as a 
secondary publisher and it could therefore raise the defence 
of innocent dissemination. Oster argued that publishers may 
invoke the defence of ‘innocent publication’ (also known as 
‘innocent dissemination’) as a fault-based concept in that the 
defence is lost if there is knowledge of the unlawful content. 
He referred to the fault-based liability of distributors: Emmens 
v Pottle, McLeod and Vizetelly which were decided against the 
backdrop of defamation as a fault-based tort. 76 
The defence of innocent dissemination – which is orig- 
inally available to secondary publishers such as vendors of 
newspaper ( Emmens v Pottle 77 ) and proprietors of a library 
( Vizetelly v Mudie’s Select Library Ltd 78 ) – can be applied to search 
engines. Traditionally, the defendant is in the ordinary course 
of business not liable for a publication in the newspaper or 
book if he can show that he did not know that it contained 
a libel; his ignorance was not due to any negligence on his 
part; and that he did not know, and had no ground for sup- 
posing, that the newspaper was likely to contain libel. Hence, 
the defence is based on the publisher’s (lack of) construc- 
tive knowledge of the publication containing the defamatory 
words. In comparison, the UK Defamation Act 1996 79 appears 
to focus on the defendant’s actual knowledge that it caused 
or contributed to the publication of the defamatory statement 
(though there is also the alternative ground of the defendant’s 
reasonable belief).80 
73 [2017] SASFC 130 para [182]. 
74 [2017] SASFC 130 para [184]. 
75 [2014] 5 HKC 375. 
76 Jan Oster, “Communication, Defamation and Liability” (2015) 
35(2) Legal Studies 348 at 355. 
77 (1885) 16 QBD 354. 
78 [1900] 2 QB 170. 
79 Section 1(1). 
80 See Tamiz v Google Inc [2013] 1 WLR 2151 (no defence for Google 
under section 1(1) because, upon notification, Google knew or had 
reason to believe that their hosting of the defamatory materials 
would cause or contribute to the publication of those materials). 
With respect to defamatory snippets and links to defama- 
tory content on the website, Corbett 81 noted that the common 
law defence of innocent dissemination is available provided 
the defendant can show that its ignorance was not due to its 
negligence. One way of demonstrating this would be for the 
search engine provider to remove search results based on text 
analysis programs which can identify potentially defamatory 
material. With the advance of machine learning, the burden 
would rest on search engines in the near future to show why 
they could not have used it to detect patterns and potentially 
defamatory material in the search output. 
It should be briefly noted that the EU E-Commerce Di- 
rective 82 provides defences for “information society service”
which are “mere conduits”,83 or which provide caching 84 
or hosting 85 services. These defences exempt the liability 
of intermediaries whose activities are of a “mere technical, 
automatic and passive nature”; significantly, the E-Commerce 
Directive adds that this implies the information society ser- 
vice provider has “neither knowledge of nor control over” the 
information transmitted or stored.86 It is argued that search 
engine operators cannot be regarded as “mere conduits”, and 
their operations extend beyond caching or hosting services. 
As mentioned above, search engines generate new content 
with respect to Autocomplete suggestions and they do not 
merely store, distribute, or facilitate the dissemination of 
content.87 For snippets, the search engine repeats the content 
from the Internet websites though the manner of extraction 
of third party content may affect the defamatory meaning. 
Moreover, depending on the evidence, search engines can 
be shown to have participated in and lent assistance to the 
publication of the defamatory content with proof of actual 
knowledge of the fact of publication. 
5. The policy arguments 
Based on the application of existing legal principles in 
defamation above, it is clear that liability on the part of search 
engines remains though the scope should be restricted. First, 
it must be proved that the search engines have committed 
an intentional act of publication of the search output (based 
on evidence of participation in or lending assistance to pub- 
lication) with actual knowledge of the fact of publication. 
Secondly, search engines could also avail themselves of 
81 Susan Corbett, “Search Engines and the Automated Process: Is 
a Search Engine Provider “a Publisher” of Defamatory Material?”
(2014) 20 NZBLQ 200 at 214. 
82 2000/31/EC, Articles 12 to 14. 
83 Article 12 applies to intermediaries which merely transmit and 
provide access to third-party content. 
84 Caching is defined in Article 13 as the “automatic, intermediate 
and temporary storage of information”. 
85 Hosting is defined in Article 14 as the “storage of information 
provided by a recipient of the service”. 
86 Recital 42. 
87 Stavroula Karapapa and Maurizio Borghi, “Search engine lia- 
bility for autocomplete suggestions: personality, privacy and the 
power of the algorithm” (2015) 23 International Journal of Law and 
Information Technology 261 at 274–275. 
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the defence of innocent dissemination as a second layer of 
protection. 
This brings us to the following questions: are there policy 
arguments that support or contradict this stance based on le- 
gal principles? Are there strong countervailing policy consid- 
erations that should override the outcomes arising from appli- 
cation of the abovementioned legal principles? We will discuss 
three sets of competing policy arguments and rationales. 
5.1. Search engine’s freedom of speech versus 
reputational interests 
Volokh noted that the search engine operator is itself a 
“speaker”88 based on the US First Amendment. It possesses 
the right to choose the content of the speech and what to 
exclude. The engineer exercises human editorial judgements. 
In the context of section 230 of the US Communication De- 
cency Act, it has been argued that allowing defamation law 
suits against interactive computer services (which includes 
search engines) would run contrary to the policy objectives 
of promoting diversity of political discourse, generating 
opportunities for cultural development and preserving the 
competitive free market and thereby produce a chilling effect 
on free speech.89 Furthermore, a search engine should not 
be expected to adhere to “some hypothetical and undefined 
expectations of abstract objectivity”, and that “change in 
algorithm design should and would be expected”.90 A related 
argument is that due to the Autocomplete suggestions being 
based on popularity as a criterion for the algorithms, the 
notion of free speech is arguably based on the marketplace of 
ideas.91 The same argument should also apply to other search 
output (snippets and images). 
With respect to links provided by search engines in re- 
sponses to users’ search queries, the majority judges in 
Crookes v Newton , in denying the claim to treat the website 
operator as a publisher of defamatory materials – relied on 
arguments premised on protecting the freedom of Internet 
and freedom of expression. Free speech is however not abso- 
lute. Deschamps J in Crookes v Newton regarded reputation as 
equally important and advocated that a hyperlinker should 
be treated as a publisher of hyperlinked content provided 
the hyperlinker has committed a deliberate act in making 
the defamatory material readily available to the third party 
audience. 
It is noted that search engines have generated new content 
for Autocomplete suggestions. As such, defamed parties can- 
not sue any primary authors in respect of the new content by 
the search engines. To the extent that these word associations 
in the Autocomplete suggestions are defamatory, reputation 
interests are clearly at stake and the only remaining legal 
88 Eugene Volokh, ‘ The First Amendment Protection for Search Engine 
Search Results ’, White Paper, 2012, at p. 17. 
89 Kacy Popyer, “Cache-22: The Fine Line between the Information 
and Defamation in Google’s Autocomplete Function” (2016) 34 Car- 
dozo Arts & Ent. L. J . 835 at 846. 
90 Eugene Volokkh, ‘ The First Amendment Protection for Search Engine 
Search Results ’, White Paper, 2012 at p. 19. 
91 Kacy-Popyer, “Cache-22: The Fine Line between the Informa- 
tion and Defamation in Google’s Autocomplete Function” (2016) 
34 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J . 835 at 859. 
avenue is to proceed against the search engine. For repeated 
or republished snippets, in which the search engines’ acts 
participated in and lent assistance to the repetition or repub- 
lication of defamatory content to a wider audience, thereby 
increasing the potential damage to reputation, liability is 
justified provided the search engine has actual knowledge 
of the fact of publication of the search output. In many of 
these cases, the original author of the defamatory postings 
may be anonymous which increases the level of difficulty and 
costs in pursuing legal actions against them. Hence, overall, 
notwithstanding the search engines’ freedom of speech, they 
should nonetheless be subject to legal liability in defamation 
to protect reputational interests in limited circumstances. 
Apart from reputational interests, search engine opera- 
tions may impinge on an individual’s personal information 
and other interests. According to the European Court of Jus- 
tice in Google Spain , the extent of protection of the individual’s 
“right to be forgotten”92 – which extends to information which 
have become “inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or 
excessive” in relation to purposes for which they were col- 
lected or processed – has to be assessed with reference to and 
balanced against the economic interests of the search engine 
operator, the data subject’s role in public life and the public in- 
terest in having access to the personal information.93 This sig- 
nificant decision led to numerous requests to Google to block 
and remove URLs.94 One important aspect is that the search 
engine would be responsible for the violation of the “right to 
be forgotten” regardless of whether the personal information 
in question consist of third party content or new content gen- 
erated by the search engine operator. 
5.2. Benefits of search engines to users and the 
commercial goals of search engines 
Verbeek 95 referred to the hermeneutic or interpretative ap- 
proach to technological mediation (the obstetric ultrasound) 
which allows for interpretation of reality (the foetus in the 
womb). Moral agency, he argues, is a matter of “human- 
technology hybrids” and not a completely human affair.96 An 
analogy may be drawn to the search engines which enable 
users to access a new reality by displaying the materials which 
he would otherwise not be exposed to without the search 
engine facility. Oster 97 argued that “[b]y aggregating and 
structuring information published on the Internet, search en- 
gines render web pages with personal information accessible, 
92 See Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC, Articles 12(b) 
(right to rectify, erase or block data relating to data subject that 
are incomplete or inaccurate) and 14(1)(a) (right to object to the 
processing of data relating to data subject). 
93 Google Spain SL [97]. 
94 Jan Oster, European and International Media Law (Cambridge Uni- 
versity Press, 2017) at p. 366. 
95 Peter-Paul Verbeek, Moralizing Technology: Understanding and De- 
signing the Morality of Things (The University of Chicago Press, 2011) 
at pp. 8–9. 
96 Peter-Paul Verbeek, Moralizing Technology: Understanding and De- 
signing the Morality of Things (The University of Chicago Press, 2011) 
at p. 17. 
97 Jan Oster, “Communication, Defamation and Liability” (2015) 
35(2) Legal Studies 348 at 359. 
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for instance, on the basis of a person’s name, which Internet 
users in many cases would not have found. Search engines 
thus assist in making statements known to the public that 
otherwise would have been a needle in a haystack.” This 
coheres with the legal approach for publication based on the 
search engine lending assistance to the publication process. 
Hinman, with his slogan “to exist is to be indexed on Google”, 
referred to search engines attempting to help users find the 
“right piece of information” as well as to avoid “extraneous”
information.98 In the case of Google Spain ,99 it was men- 
tioned that search engines provide users with a “structured 
overview” of the aggregated information about an individual 
including detailed profiles of the individual. 
Volokh noted that the search engines’ automated results 
are necessary for users to gain “quick and comprehensive ac- 
cess to information – both the speech of the search engines 
expressing their decisions about how to rank and the speech 
of the sites referenced by the search engines’ speech”.100 Kohl 
referred to search engines as the “light that allows us to see cy- 
berspace” and the “interface through which we interact with 
the Internet and thereby with the world at large”.101 Hence, it 
is clear that overall, search engines offers substantial public 
benefit in facilitating access to a wealth of information. 
It is submitted that though the search engines are bene- 
ficial to users, they are after all commercial entities. Search 
engines enjoy commercial benefits and the opportunities for 
profit-making from users through advertising and sponsored 
links as well as access to the data sets pertaining to the mil- 
lions of users. To the extent that they enjoy the commercial 
benefits, they should also be subject to the risks and bur- 
dens of business and attendant legal liabilities arising from 
defamation. 
5.3. Normative role of search engines: subjective 
and objective elements 
Hinman refers to search engines as “gatekeepers of the 
Web”.102 How do or should we describe this “gatekeeping”
role? Grimmelmann 103 considers the two roles of search en- 
gines: as an “objective conduit or a subjective editor”104 and fi- 
nally advocates a middle ground based on the advisor theory 
of search. Search neutrality under the objective conduit ap- 
proach suggests that search results are to be treated like maps. 
Under the editor theory, on the other hand, there is ample 
98 Hinman, L. M., 2005. “Esse Est Indicato in Google: Ethical and 
Political Issues in Search Engines,” International Review of Informa- 
tion Ethics , 3: 19–25 at 21. 
99 Google Spain SL [37]. 
100 Eugene Volokh, ‘ The First Amendment Protection for Search Engine 
Search Results ’, White Paper, 2012, at p. 10. 
101 Uta Kohl, “Google: The Rise and Rise of Online Intermediaries 
in the Governance of the Internet and beyond (part 2)” (2013) 21 
International Journal of Law & Technology 187 at 193. 
102 Hinman, L. M., 2005. “Esse Est Indicato in Google: Ethical and 
Political Issues in Search Engines,” International Review of Informa- 
tion Ethics , 3: 19–25 at 21. 
103 Grimmelmann, James, “Speech Engines”Minnesota Law Review . 
2014, Vol. 98 Issue 3, pp. 868–952. 
104 Grimmelmann, James, “Speech Engines”Minnesota Law Review . 
2014, Vol. 98 Issue 3 at 871. 
room for editorial judgement and discretion which can lead 
to potential search engine bias. Put in another way, the con- 
duit theory looks at search through the websites’ eyes whilst 
the editor theory looks at search through search engines’ eyes. 
Grimmelmann suggests instead that we enquire what search 
would look like through users’ eyes.105 This refers to a listener- 
oriented approach where search engines attempt to empower 
users to identify for themselves the speech they wish to 
hear.106 Thus, the normative theory for evaluating search en- 
gine is that it should be a helpful, trustworthy advisor .107 
Search engines have the capacity to shape people’s world- 
view through the use of formulas based on “personaliza- 
tion”which generate search results tailored to a user’s profile. 
Pariser 108 has linked this ideological isolation and propaganda 
spreading to the workings of the algorithms that operate be- 
hind the scenes of Internet giants such as Google and Face- 
book. He warns that these algorithms, which most people do 
not know and do not think about, have a great influence on 
what we see and hear on the Internet, creating a “filter bub- 
ble” where we only get to see information that corresponds 
with our own views (personalised information) or those of the 
state or the company (propaganda). Sunstein 109 warned that 
the selectivity of data made possible by Internet filtering can 
easily trap us inside our “information cocoons.” Lessig 110 cau- 
tioned that filtering on the Internet is equivalent to censorship 
because it blocks out some forms of expression. 
It is clearly possible for search engines to intentionally and 
manually lower the ranking for a particular website outside of 
the automated system. This, as observed by the US court in the 
case of Search King Inc v Google Technologies Inc ,111 can “distort 
the objectivity” of the ranking system. 
Goldman 112 observed that in order to “prevent anarchy and 
preserve credibility”, search engines must unavoidably exer- 
cise some editorial control over their systems. Search engine 
bias is the unavoidable consequence of search engines exer- 
cising such editorial control. Ironically, the personalised rank- 
ing algorithms may reduce the effects of search engine bias. 
This is because the use of personalised algorithms will re- 
sult in “multiple “top” search results for a particular search 
term instead of a single “winner”. Moreover, they will give less 
weight to popularity-based metrics.113 
Search engines should not be allowed to unilaterally censor 
third party content based on what it views as legal or illegal 
content. Instead, it should be as neutral as possible and such 
105 Grimmelmann, James, “Speech Engines”Minnesota Law Review . 
2014, Vol. 98 Issue 3 at 893. 
106 Grimmelmann, James, “Speech Engines”Minnesota Law Review . 
2014, Vol. 98 Issue 3 at 894. 
107 Grimmelmann, James, “Speech Engines”Minnesota Law Review . 
2014, Vol. 98 Issue 3 at 895. 
108 Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding From You , 
Penguin Books, 2011. 
109 Republic.com , Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. 
110 Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace , New York: Basic Books, 2000. 
111 Case No. CIV 02-1457-M, United States District Court of the 
Western District of Oklahoma, 13 Jan 2003. 
112 Goldman, E., “Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search En- 
gine Utopianism” 8 Yale J.L. & Tech. 188 at 195-196 (2005–2006). 
113 Goldman, E., “Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search En- 
gine Utopianism” 8 Yale J.L. & Tech. 188 at 199 (2005–2006). 
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decisions on lawful or unlawful content should ultimately be 
left to the courts and lawmakers. Internet intermediaries are 
de facto gatekeepers but courts and law makers are the gate- 
keepers de jur e. When search engines have to make decisions 
whether to take down content or otherwise in the event of 
complaints of defamatory search output, they have to take 
guidance from the courts. These may also involve procedu- 
ral notice and take-down mechanisms which give parties an 
opportunity to respond or object.114 As a matter of practice, 
it is recognised that search engines bear some risk. It may be 
difficult for search engines to know in certain cases whether 
the output generated is defamatory or not. Further, the search 
engines may be hard put to determine whether the defama- 
tory content is true or false or whether some other defence 
applies. 
Nonetheless, the search engines’ role is not completely 
objective or neutral. They possess discretion in the design 
of algorithms and in the choice of key terms for inclusion or 
exclusion. Such discretion should be subject to supervision by 
the law or courts. Whilst there should be a degree of editorial 
judgement and discretion afforded to the search engines, 
there are objective lines which can be drawn. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper argues that search engine operators should not be 
automatically immune from legal liability for search results 
and Autocomplete suggestions. However, the scope of poten- 
tial liability should be restricted. Policy considerations favour 
restricting the responsibility of search engines but cannot 
fully immunise them from legal liabilities. The search engines’ 
freedom of speech is counterbalanced by the need to protect 
the reputational interests of persons defamed by defamatory 
snippets, images and Autocomplete suggestions. Whilst the 
benefits afforded to users in the ease of search and flow of 
information on the Internet are apparent, the search engines 
have also profited financially and must bear the risks flow- 
ing from their business initiatives. As gatekeepers of the web, 
search engines enjoy a degree of subjective discretion and ed- 
itorial judgement with respect to information flow on the In- 
ternet and thereby exercise considerable influence on users. 
As such, this subjective role should be balanced by objective 
controls to be exercised by the law and courts. 
The legal analysis should be sensitive to the different types 
of search output. The snippets and images are generated by 
the search engine from the content in various Internet web- 
sites. The search engine operators are liable for the snippets 
and images to the same extent as the original website un- 
der the repetition rule. However, Autocomplete suggestions 
should be regarded as new content generated by the search 
engines themselves. In order to decide whether search en- 
gines had in fact published the defamatory search output, 
one has to enquire whether those acts amount to either 
participation in and/or lending assistance to the publication 
114 See, for example, Section 5 of the UK Defamation Act 2013 ap- 
plicable to website operators and accompanying regulations. 
process. This goes towards establishing the fact of publica- 
tion. The search engine must be shown to have intentionally 
published the defamatory search output. It is suggested that 
this should be based on proof of the search engine’s actual 
knowledge of the fact of publication relating to the relevant 
search output. There is no necessity to prove that the search 
engine operator knew that the specific search output was 
defamatory. 
On the other hand, it is not conceptually sound to apply the 
doctrine of publication by omission to determine search en- 
gine liability. The concept of publication by omission – which 
was originally used to determine whether the defendant 
as an occupier of premises was responsible for defamatory 
graffiti by third-party trespassers – is based on its consent 
to the continued presence of the defamatory publication put 
up by another thereby giving rise to a legal responsibility for 
the publication. In the case of Autocomplete suggestions, the 
generation of new content in terms of the word associations 
is the act of the search engine not the primary authors. In the 
case of snippets and images, the search engine generates and 
selects materials via its automatic search process to produce 
specific search results in response to a specific search query. 
It cannot be said that search engine, by its inaction, was 
purely consenting to the continued presence of the offending 
material put up by someone else on the Internet. 
Hence, determining the relevant acts of publication and in- 
tentionality as to the fact of publication on the part of search 
engines is crucial. Based on the lack of editorial control and 
ex ante knowledge for snippets, images and Autocomplete 
suggestions, the search engine should be treated as a sec- 
ondary publisher. Secondary publishers should be entitled to 
avail themselves of the defence of innocent dissemination 
provided the lack of knowledge that the search output con- 
tained libelous content is not due to the search engines’ neg- 
ligence. 
Search engine liability in defamation can indeed be anal- 
ysed by reference to the existing framework comprising 
pre-Internet case and the more modern precedents relating 
to Internet intermediaries. Nonetheless, there are certain nu- 
ances in the justifications and explanations peculiar to search 
engines. New wine can certainly fit into old bottles though this 
may mean the flavour will change somewhat along the way. 
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